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In the last two decades, economists have contributed major
insights that have enriched our understanding of the labor supply
decisions of individuals. The theoretical structure of the traditional
labor-leisure choice model was generalized in a seminal article by Gary
Becker,1His household production modelpermittedone to enter time
in varying intensities in all the connnodities produced by individuals.
Jacob Mincer argued persuasively that an individual's decision
about the amount of hours to exchange for market dollars is often made
in a family context.2 Hence, the hours of work of any familymember
dependnot only on his wage and other variables specific_to him, but
also on /imilar variables of othermembers andon those variables conunon
to the family unit. The household production modelprovidesa useful
theoretical framework in which one may analyze family labor supply issues.
In this model, the family is viewed as if it were a small firm producing
its ultimate wants within the household. In order to satisfy these wants,
the family (firm) combines purchased market goods and services with the
time of various family members. This approach differs from the tradi-
tional treatment of the labor-leisure choice decision since the price of
activity now has two components -thegoods price and the time price
of each family member. The relative empirical importance of the two
components depends, of course, on their respective shares in the cost of
producing an activity.—2—
Anumber of statistical studies have demonstrated that many
empirical regularities were consistent with an economic explanation
of the allocation of tinie.3 Yet, it was apparent that serious defi-
ciencies remained in the theory. In the one-period framework in which
the model is placed, the variables that determine the levels of market
participation are long-run or permanent measures of wage rates and
wealth. Since the reference period is some concept of life time, the
model is best suited to predict average lifetime participation rates.
But individuals are also confronted with temporal variations in wage
rates and other variables that could elicit timing responses about
the long-run levels desired. A complete model of labor supply should
incorporate the impact of this variation on the timing of market
responses. In recent papers, Ghez andBecker4 extended Becker's original
one period model to a lifetime context, and thus they were able to
place in sharp focus the previously neglected influence of cyclical,
seasonal, and life cycle movements in wage rates and other variables.
This paper builds on their work by treating explicitly the family context
in which these decisions are made and two related issues are investigated.
First, for each family member, how is the available life—time stock of -
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-
timedistributed over time between market and non—market activities
Secondly, within the family unit, what potential exists for substituting
—thetime of one member for that of another?
Indecidingonthenumber of hourseachmember should supply, the
familyis actually confronted with two problems. Given the long run or
permanent values of family wealth and the wages of the individual members,
the family determines the lifetime levels of market time of each of
its members. In addition, since the family is faced with temporal—3-.
variations in wages and other variables, a decision must be made
concerning the optimal timing of hours of the individual members. At
any moment in time, let the family combine market goods and time in
such a way that the cost of obtaining the desired bundle of conmiodities
is minimized. But the consuming unit also must allocate its consumption
over time in a manner consistent with its taste for commodities in
the future and the expected prices of the future commodities relative
to present prices. Combining this intertempora]. utility maximization
problem with that of the least cost combination of inputs of time and
goods to use in each period yields some interesting and testable
predictions concerning the market hours behavior of individual members
over time.5
Assume for simplicity that the intertemporal utility function of
a family that has an horizon of n periods (equal to its life span) is of
the CES variety, so that it may be written
____ a-l
(1)u =Cf zCeat d
where U is family utility, Z represents the level of consumption of
"commodities" in period t, the a is the time preferece parameter, and a
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. The Z's
are produced within the household by employing as resources purchased
marketgoods (Xt) and the time inputs of the husband (Mt) and wife (Ft)
(2)Z—4—
where f is homogeneous of degree one, and is a technical parameter
that permits the efficiency of production to vary with age. The family
is faced with both time and money constraints that can be written
(using the price of market goods as nulueraire) as
(3a) Mt + =Ft
+NftT t =1,2, .,n
(3b)J X erdt =!(WtN+ WftNf)e dt + A
The time constraint (3a) indicates that the total amount of time
available to each family member (T, a given) in every period is absorbed
either in the household production process or in hours at work (Nt and
Nft). Equation (3b) states that the discounted value of money expen-
ditures on goods is equal to discounted market earnings of both the
husband and wife and initial property wealth (A0). The two constraints





is Becker's "full wealth" concept, and
=(X+ WtMt + wftFt>/Zt
is the average or unit cost of production of Z. When is minimized,
it is independent of Z, and therefore is the marginal cost or shadow
price of Z.—5—
Equations(1), (2) and (4) constitute the complete structure of
the model. It is assumed that the family desires to maximize lifetime
utility (1) subject to the production function (2) and the wealth
constraint (4). This problem is easily solved with a two-stage opti-
mization procedure. First maximize utility (1) subject to the budget
restraint (4) with prices w taken as given. The result of this maxi-
mization is the demand function (or consumption function) for the basic
commodity at each age(t),as follows:
(5) =Rc1—%
where P is the lifetime "price index" of the basic commodity.
Solvingfor the percentage change in consumption from one period
to the next, we have
dZt d1r
(6) = + a(r—ci)
t t
where ais an index oftime preference indicating whether the family has
time preference forthe present (a>0),for the future (ci< 0)or
neutraltime preference (a=0).
Note that the full wealth term (RIP)droswhen we consider changes
in the levels of consumption over time. If individuals do not have
unbiased expectations about future earnings, then the level of full
wealth does not change. Therefore, with these assumptions, an individual's
full wealth will not affect the change in consumption from one period to
the next.
The second step in maximizing lifetime utility involves minimizing
the price at each age t. At cost minimization, the following holds—6—
for the inputs of the husband and wife, where 0jj is the Allen partial
elasticity of substitution between inputs i and j:6
dM .dZ dw dw dB
(7) Mtt = — (SFOMF+ Sx(1.x) w + SFØMFWft
-
Btt
Substituting (6) and (7) and expressing the changes in commodity prices
in terms of input prices, we have the demand equations for husbands' and









(9) =—(Sci +Sa +Sa ) +S(a—a)
F Fc MMF XMX w mMF C w
t ft mt
dB
+a(r—a)+(a —1) c C
Equations (8) and (9) indicate that the hours of work of each
family member, given the parameters of the utility and production function,
are determined by variations in the price of time of both members, the rate
of interest, and time preference,7 and any changes in the technology of
household production in the course of the aging process.
To illustrate: as the real wage of the wife increases over the life
cycle, the amount of her time spent in the household will decline for
two reasons. Because the price of one of the inputs is rising, the relative
price of future commodities has risen. The resulting decline in future
.—7—
consunptionwill, on this "scale" effect, reduce the demand for wife's
home time. The magnitude of this effect (represented by SFOc) depends
on the possibilities for intertemporal substitution (i.e., the larger
the more elastic is the demand curve for commodities) and the share
in total costs of the wife's time. In addition to this intertemporal
substitution between commodities, there exists the possibility of substi-
in the production process. As Wft increases, the wife's time will be
substituted against by the other two inputs. This effect (SMOMF +
will also lead to a decline in the use of wife's time as her real wage
rises.8 It follows that in those periods when the real wage of the wife
is high, the model predicts, ceteris paribus, that her hours of market
work will also be high. Note that in contrast to the traditional one—
period labor-leisure choice, the sign of this effect is unambiguous. Since
full wealth is fixed in this analysis, there are no income effects. It
is, of course, the existence of income effects in the static theory which
gives rise to the possibility of a negatively sloped supply curve of hours.
As the real wage of the husband varies over his lifetime, the
effect on hours worked by his wife is again determined by the two avenues
of substitution. Increases in the price of his time will also raise the
price of future commodities and induce a fall in the use of all inputs
including the time of his wife. However, in the production process, the
relative price of wife's time is declining, and F per unit of output will t
increase if the two time inputs are substitutes (c, > 0). Thus, the
behavior of hours of work of the wife is ambiguous with respect to the waqe
of the husband. If commodity substitution swamps substitution in production—8—
>a)her market hours will increase as her husband's real wage
rises. The roles of a positive interest rate and the degree of time
preference are the standard Fisherian ones. A positive interest rate
(by lowering discounted prices) and time preference for the future will
increase future consumption and decrease hours of work of all family
dB
members. The interpretation of the term Bt )isan interesting one.
t
Since the type of technical change is of the Ricks neutral variety, a
one per cent improvement in efficiency will lower future prices by one
per cent and increase the amount consumed in the future. The effect on
the use of inputs because input requirements per unit of output have
also declined by one per cent. Whether time at home increases with an
improvement in the efficiency of home time depends on whether the elasticity
of demand for commodities is greater than one —1>0).
Life Cycle Patterns
Because the available data on the actual age patterns of market
work for married men and women was limited in its detail and quality, I
constructeda new set of profiles from a subsample of the 1967 Survey of
Economic Opportunity.These age profiles turned out to be quitefasci-
nating and illustrate, in a way not possible with multivariate regression
techniques, the richness of the life cycle approach.
The subsample consisted of those black and white families with
both spouses present. It was further restricted to nan-farm families
whose husbands' age was between 18 and 65 inclusive. The husbands were
required to have worked at least one week in 1966At each husband's age,jr f& jr
— 9—
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arithmeticmeans of the labor supply and wage variables werecalculated.
To smooth the data, three year moving averages of the means were taken.
In order to observe racial and educational differences, the total sample
was stratified by race and into three education classes of the husband.
The education groups were elementary grades 1—8; high school grades 9-12;
and college grades 13 or higher.
Since these profiles are derived from cross-sectional data, we are
not, as we move along any profile, following a single cohort through its/
lifecycle experience. Eachobservationrepresents a separate cohort at
onepoint in its life cycle path. The entire profile captures both movements
along life cycle paths and across profiles of different cohorts. If the
between cohort effects are important, these profiles should be adjusted
beforeone hasa "pure" life cycle profile. The large secular increases in
labor force participation rates for married women suggestthat, for this
groupat least, the across cohort changes are not negligible.9 Since these
rateshave incrased over time, an adjusted profile for those of cohort
age 19 in 1967 would be above the profiles presented here. This qualifi-
cation should be kept in mind in the discussion thatfollows.In Appendix
C, these profiles obtained from 1967 SEO data are compared to ones obtained
from the 1960 U.S. Census.
Table 1 lists the average lifetime market participation levels of
married men andwomenin different education and racial groups. Not
surprisingly,market participation of married white women is well below
that of married white men. This difference is reflected in all dimensions
of market work. In an average year, over 40 percent of white women specialize
exclusively in activities that occur in the non-market sector. Those women
ITable____


















WhiteMen 2147.5 43.84 48.82 NAC NA 2147.5 3.44
WhiteWomen 1486.0 34.46 36.58 .52 .35 563.4 2.16
BlackMen 1963.7 40.69 47.71 NA NA 1963.7 2.37
BlackWomen 1385.6 33.58 35.36 .65 .52 662.6 1.68
WhiteMen --
Elementary 2039.1 42.43 48.04 NA NA 2039.1 2.64
WhiteWomen --
Elementary 1515.4 35.91 35.33 .48 .31 511.5 1.77
WhiteMen --
HighSchool 2171.6 44.15 49.06 NA NA 2171.6 3.24
WhiteWomen --
HighSchool 1496.2 34.62 37.14 .53 .37 594.0 2.10
WhiteMen --
College 2189.2 44.26 •49.33 NA NA 2189.2 4.44
WhiteWomen --
College 1434.5 33.71 35.82 : .49 .33 505.6 2.53
C
Notes:
aAveraged over labor market members only.
bLFPR =laborforce participation rate.
CNAnotavailable.
Source:Smith(1972). These are life-cycle means for 1966.
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whoare participants work fewer weeks in any year, and a smaller number
of hours in any week. The spread in male/female market productivity--as
measured by hourly wage rates of $3.44 and $2.16——no doubt accounts for
much of the gap in market hours per year. After the schooling period,
annual market hours quite clearly increase as we move toward the more
educated white classes. This rise in annual hours takes place in both
dimensions of labor supply——weeks worked and hours per week—-a phenomenon
readily explained in the one—period model by the rising level of male
market wages by education class. Within every education class, men spend
approximately four times as many hours in the market sector as women do.
Relative to their wives, men's lifetime market participation and hourly
wage both increase as we move up the education scale.
The lifetime levels of market participation are, in all dimensions,
lower for black males than for white males. These lower levels are
paralled by a smaller hourly return for black males from market activity.
In fact, the intrafamily wage structure differs by race. Relative male/female
wages are lower in blaek families, offering them market incentives to be
less wife—time—intensive in home work. Black women indeed perform more
market work, both absolutely and relative to their husbands, than white
women. Racial comparisons for women must be made carefully, for the
magnitude of the differences by race depends critically on the dimension of
labor supply used. Most studies of female labor supply have compared racial
groups by their weekly labor force participation rates. These rates are
50 percent higher for black women, but this grossly overstates the true
racial differences. Although a smaller fraction of white women than black— 12—
womenare laborforcemembers, those white womeninthe labor force
work more hours per year than black women participants. Therefore, when
measures of working time include zero valñes for non—workers, black
women work less than 20 percent (100 hours) a year more than white won.
Moreintriguing than the levels are the fluctuations between different
stages of the life cycle. Life cycle variations in market work of married
white males are illustrated in Fig. la. Theoverallpattern of annual
working hours with its inverted U shape conforms quite well to implications
10
derived fromthelife cycle model. The age profile of wage rates combined
witha positive interest rate renders intelligible both theinvertedU
shape and the peaking aspects of these graphs of hours worked. Since wages
are relatively low for the younger cohorts, they have an incentive to
concentrate their time in non—market pursuits. A positive interest rate is
consistent with the falling hours during the older ages and the peaking
)ofhours before wage rates. The resulting lower discounted prices of
future consumption increase the derived demandforhome time at the older
ages. A positive interest rate also implies that discounted commodity
prices will decline before real wage rates and that annual working hours
will lead wages in their respective peaks)2 Since the peak in hours precedes
that in hourly wages, earnings will decline before hourlywagerates.13
Wages begin to fall in the late fifties (Fig. ib), while earnings profiles
are known to peak in the late forties or early fifties. Although the
existing literature has emphasized such factors as human physical depre-
ciation with age, i.e., deterioration in health or disinvestments in human
capital, apparently a substantial fraction of the decline in earnings for
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Theprofiles generated for black males add additional support to
the life cycle model. Their annual hours prOfile (Fig. 5a) also has the
inverted U form--the expected shape in view of the age variation in
their hourly wages and positive interest rates. Hoursworkedpeak at a
younger age, which reflects in our model the earlier maximumvalueof
black hourly wages (Fig. 5b). The latter fact implies that, compared to
white males, commodity prices achieve their extreme values at a younger
age for Negroes, which in turn leads to the confirmed prediction on the
earlier peaking of their market time. Compared to white males, both the
working time and wage profiles are somewhatflatterfor blacks. In the
life cycle model, the degree of curvature in the hours profile is directly
related to the amountofcurvature in the wage profile.
Interpretation of the differences among male white education groups
is more difficult because of fluctuations evidently caused by the smaller
cell sizes for these groups)5 Still, the age pattern of male annual
hours within each education class (Fig. 2c) is on the whole similar to
that of the complete white sample although the presence of an initial period
of rising hours in the elementary profile is questionable. The small cell
sizes make the pre-thirty-year-old section of the elementary profile so
erratic that no clear trend is discernible. The tendency for the annual
hours profiles to flatten oUt for the less educated groups is consistent
with the flattening of the wage profiles. Because wages peak later for the
more educated (Fig. 2a), the empirical finding that annualmarkethours
peak at an older age the more educated the group also is a confirmation of
one implication of the life cycle model.
Economists have used a number of operational definitions of women's
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(c) Annual hours worked by education cis
Fig.2—Mcile and female hourly wage rate, all white married
men and women by education level of husband
19 23 27 31 35 39 43 47 51 55 59 63— 15—
weeklylabor-force-participation rates. In recent papers, Reuben Gronau S
andH. Gregg Lewis16haveargued that, from a theoretical perspective,
these supply definitions should not be viewed as alternative empirical
measures of an identical theoretical concept. The hours profiles of
married white women are a strong empirical confirmation to their argntent.
It is clear in Fig. 3 that any single definitiOn if considered in isolation
fromtheothers, would yield a misleading description of the life cycle
pattern of female labor supply. The best single descriptive statistic
combines the labor-force-participation dimension with the annual working
hours of working wives. Average time at home (Fig. lc) at any age is defined
to be a weighted average of the timespentat home of working and non-
working women with the weights being the fraction of women working and not
working)7 Atthebeginning of the cycle, average market hours of all
married white women (Fig. lc) are relatively high with a substantial
fraction of women working at some time during the year (Fig. 3d), but on
an irregular and short term basis as indicated by the low number of weeks
worked (Fig. 3a). Then time at home increases continuously into the
middle thirties as many white women leave the labor force completely. This
incrase in home time is mainly a consequence of the declining weekly and
yearly labor-force-participation rates. The small increase in hours worked
of working women could be either a true increase in the work year of the
remaining labor force members or merely a compositional effect resulting
from the labor market withdrawal of women whose working time was well
below the average. Following the home time peak in the thirties, these
women spend an increasing amount of their time in the market sector until
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all whte married women— 18—
Oneshould recognize, however, that many aspects of the women's
profiles are also consistent with life—cycle variations in the relative
wages of the marriage partners. Compared to their husbands, white
female hourly wages are relatively age invariant (Fig. id) and also peak
at an earlier age. One prediction of human capital theory is that wage
profiles will rise more rapidly and peak later, the greater the amount
a worker invests in himself)9 Because of the smaller fraction of future
time they will spend in the market, women have less incentive to invest
in market forms of human capital. The profile of the relative wage of
husbands to wives (Fig. lf) has a concave shape with the largest increases
in male relative wages occurring at the youngest ages.2° Relative to
hiswife, both a husband's wage and market time are lowest at the youngest
ages.Themost rapid increases in his relative market time (Fig. le)
before the mid—thirties occur simultaneously with the sharpest increases in
his relative wages. Therefore, these profiles are not inconflict with
amodel allowing inter-family substitutionof time as the value of time
of one of the members changes. Of course, the movement in relative wages
and the family formationprocess jointly contribute to the observed allo-
cationof time between the two sectors.
If white wives are classified by their husband's education level
(Fig. 4), the principal differences are the following: (1) before age thirty,
wives' non-market hours are negatively related to their husbands' educa-
tional attainment; (2) between age thirty and fifty, women in the college
group engage in home activities to a much greater extent than women in either
of the other two groups; (3) after age thirty, the difference in levels








Fig. 4—Annualtime at home and relative time of men to women
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betweenhigh school and elementary groups; (4) the peak level of home
time occurs at an older age, the more educated the group; and (5) there
is a tendency for women's hours profiles (particularly in relative terms
(Fig. 4b)) to flatten out, the lower the education level of the husband.
All five dissimilarities are consistent with differences among
education groups in age—related variations within family units in market
and non-market productivities. The positive correlation at the youngest
ages between female market participation and educational attainment
presumably results from the larger expected levels of relative male wages
in future periods for the more educated. This supplies the more educated
women with incentives to concentrate their market activity at those ages
in which the husbands' comparative advantage in market activities is not
as strong. The more rapid withdrawal of educated women from the market
sector into the mid—thirties coincides with a steeply rising relative male
wage.21 Between ages thirty and fifty, relative male wages and market
hours increases with education level, and the largest differences in both
relative hours and relative wages is between the high school and college
groups. The peak levels of both female relative home time and male relative
wage are achieved at an older age the more educated the group.22 Finally,
as predicted by the model, corresponding to less curvature in the relative
wage profiles for the less educated is the decline in the curvature of
the relative hours profiles.
Note that for all whites and for each education subsample, variations
in relative market productivities of spouses become less important as
the family unit ages. The profiles of relative husband/wife market time
begin increasingly to mirror life cycle movements in the relative non-market
productivities of spouses. The decline in relative male market time— 21—
betweenages thirty and fifty is caused by changes in female non-market S
productivityflowing from the declining fraction of women with young
children at home. After age fifty, this variation in non-market produc-
tivity is also less important as children leave home. The lack of
variation in either relative market or non—market productivity is matched
by a generally constant relative hours profile during this period.
The profiles for black married women (Fig. Sc) are more similar to
the observed male profiles than they are to those of white females.23
Bothblackmarried men andwomenhave inverted U shaped market hours
profiles. This translates into a very erratic black husband—wife relative
hours profile (Fig. Se) with no clear trend discernible. The sharpest
contrast between the hours behavior of black and white married females
occurs before age thirty-five. During this period, black women are special-
izing more in market pursuits while their white female counterparts are
approaching their peak level of home participation.
A number of factors could account for this striking difference betwee
white and black married women. The relative male/female wage structure
for blacks exhibits less variation over the cycle (Fig. Sf) than that of
whites. This would imply that the relative hours variation for blacks should
also be smaller. The patterns of child spacing and timing also offers a
partial explanation for the hours behavior of black women. Black women do
not generally concentrate their childbearing in a relatively short time
interval. Because of this, they have less incentive to respond to the
presence of young children by lowering their market participation. Another
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increasesthe cost of complete home specialization for blacks. Finally,
the black wage profiles might be dominated by secular increases in black
wage levels. The observed decline in black female wages with age (Fig. 5f)
is surely not a life cycle phenomenon but an indication of the improving
status of the younger cohorts. In the empirical sections that follow, the
evidence on these hypotheses is investigated.
S— 24—
EmpiricalTests
The ideal data to use to test a life cycle theory would be
observations on the same individuals over a number of years. But the
absence of extensive panel data forces a researcher to attempt to
simulate it with the more available cross sectional surveys. Fortunately,
Ghez
24
has developed techniques that, under appropriate assumptions,
enable one to use cross sectional information. First, the sample is
stratified by the age of the husband. Within every age group, mean values
of all variables are calculated. In the absence of secular growth, the
observed variation between these age cells will correspond to the expected
life cycle variation for any cohort if a cohort's expectations are unbiased
on average.25 Using equations (8) and (9) and aggregating over all
families at each age Ct) of husbands, we have, neglecting changes in home
productivity
26
d d t mt ft
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(11) log =d+ d1 log Wft + d2 log w +d3 t
Equations (10) and (11) are the demandequations for male and female home
timethat were estimated. From the theory, we expect that C1 and d1 will— 25—
benegative, since increasing the price of a factor induces two substi-
tution effects both lowering the amountoftime at home. No a priori
predictions can be made on the signs of C2andd2 because altering the
wage of one spouse produces conflicting incentives for the use of time
of the other spouse. c3 and d3 are the age coefficients that capture
the interplay of interest rates and time preference. If families have
neutral time preferences and face positive interest rates,
03 and d3
will be positive.
In this empirical strategy, one is implicitly assuming that families
at age j in 1967 would in i years be in a situation identical to families
of age i +jin 1967. Yet, we know that real wages have grown over time
so that younger cohorts have a higher expected real wealth. As long as
real wages grow at a constant rate secularly, the estimated wage coeff i—
dent will be unbiased, but the age coefficient will be a biased estimate
of the interest rate effect.27 Intuitively, if real wealth grows at a
constant rate over time, wealth becomes perfectly negatively correlated
with age and all wealth effects are picked up in the age variable.
The empirical results are based on the subsample of the 1967 SEO
described above. Although all the variables used are listed and defined in
Table 1 ,afew deserve additional comments. Hours spent in home
production is a difficult variable to measure precisely. One simple solution
for husbands is to treat all non-working hours as time spent at home. This
approach uses CI-JR1M which is simply the difference between total number
of hours per year (8760) and the number of working hours. This method has
several shortcomings since many non-working hours are spent neither producing— 26—
norconsuming but in investments in Human Capital, both through formal
schooling and on-the-job investments, in job search and in poor health.
Moreover, we know that the number of hours engaged in these activities
varies considerably with age (i.e., investments generally occur at the
youngest ages while sick days are more numerous for the elderly). To
reduce the biases caused by time spent at school, regressions were run
including persons in each schooling class who are at least several years
older than those typically completing that class. Thus the college
sample was run over the age intervals 26—64 and the elementary sample for
ages 18-64. The SEO allowed me to obtain a measure of the time spent
looking for work and a crude measure of annual hours ill.28 The second
definition of male home time subtracted from total yearly hours, the time
spent working, looking for work and ill.
Defining home time for married womeniseven more difficult. It
would be misleading to consider only the behavior of participating women
for this ignores completely the home specialization of non-workers.
Therefore, all women were divided into three categories: (1) women who did
not work at all; (2) women who worked both in the survey week and the
previous year; and (3) women who worked during the previous year but not
in the survey week. Average home time for women (CHR1F) was then defined
as a weighted average of the home time of women in each category with the
weights being the proportion of women in each category.29 The second
definition of female home time (CHR2F) excluded from home time time working,




UPS Hours worked in SEO survey week
WKSWK Weeksworked in 1966
WKSWK2 Weeksworked andlookingfor work in 1966
WKSWK3F Weeksworked in 1966 for women who worked in 1966
andduringSEO survey week
WKSWK4F Weeksworked in 1966 for women who worked in 1966
anddidnot work in SEO survey week
HRYR Annual Hours Worked =HRS•WKSWK
cHR1M Male AnnualHomeHours 8760 -HP.ThM
LFPWK Fraction of womenworking in SEO survey week
LFPR Fraction of womenworking in 1966
(HR1F Female Hours at Home =(1-LFPYRje760 +LFPWY(87GO-HR?R:)
+ (IZPYR-LFPwK) (8760- (WKSWK4F HRSF (WKSWK4F/WKSWK3F))
HEALTH AnnualHours Ill
CHR2M MaleAnnual Home Hours8760- (WKSWX2W HRS1 + HEALThM)
cHR2F cHR1F -(HEALTh+femaletime looking for work)
WKWG Wages before deductions in SEO survey week
HRWG Hourly Wage =WKWG/HRS
WKY Workingmen's compensation from injuries (including
sickpay and unemployment compensation and public
welfare payments)
OADI SocialSecurity payments and government, private,
aridveterans pensions
WTHY Interest, divideids, rent, annuities, and royalties
AGE Age of Males
KUSV Number of children under seven years old
di1theregression tables, some variable names includeas a final letter either
theletter HorF which indicates that the variablereferstomalesor females res-
pecti;ely. Ifthevariable name isprecededbytheletter L, the variable isin logs.— 28—
Toreduce the effect of measurement error, three year moving
averages of all variables were calculated. Since the number of obser-
vations in an age cell, varied with age, heteroscedasticity in the error
term was expected. The conventional remedy was applied by weighting
each observation (age cell) by its cell size.3°
For both the white and black male samples, the own wage elasticity
(male hourly wages) has the predicted negative sign. The persistence
of this finding is encouraging for this wage coefficient is likely to be
strongly biased towards positive values. Hourly wages are computed by
dividing weekly wages by hours worked last week. Thus any positive errors
present in hours will reappear as negative ones in hourly wages introducing
a spurious positive correlation between home time and hourly wage rates.
Secondly, true wage rates are underestimated at the younger ages because
of self-financing of on-the-job—training. Time spend in job training
activities is expected to decline with age so that this source of bias will
be a declining function of age. Therefore, the observed wage variation
with age exceeds the true one biasing the wage elasticities in Table 2
towards zero values. Using the male survey week weekly wage in place of
male hourly wages provides some control over the measurement error biases
since the weekly wages and home time are separate questions in the SEO
survey.As expected, the coefficient on the male weekly wage variable is
more negative than male hourly wages. The extent of the bias present with
thecomputedhourly wage should be negatively related to the average number
of observations in each age cell. Apparently, this was the case for the
difference in magnitude of the weekly and hourly wage coefficients were
larger in those samples with the smaller cell sizes——the black and education— 29—
specificwhite samples. In all five samples of Table 2, the sizes of
the male weekly wage coefficients was similar and all had the predicted
negative sign.
An additional test of the errors in variables problem was performed.
A second weekly wage measure was available from the SEO by dividing last
year's earnings by last year's weeks worked. With the weekly wage variable
in the text, the dependent hours variable and independent wage variable
areconstructedindependently of each other. This is not true for this
second weekly wage definition so that regressions with this wage variable
still contain the spurious negative correlation between market time and
wages. If one compares the coefficients of the two weekly wage variables,
one would expect based on the errors in variables problem, that the
coefficient for the second weekly wage is less negative than those reported
in the text. Also the difference between with the two wages should be
negatively related to the average cell size. Both these propositions were
supported when the second weekly wage concept was used.
I anticipated difficulty in estimating an independent effect for
female wages. First, the true life cycle variation in female wages is
small compared to that of male wages so that it should play a smaller role
is explaining the timing of market participation of family members. Secondly,
during any week approximately sixty percent of married women are not
working. Therefore, each mean female wage is based on fewer observations
than the mean male wage, and on this account, the mean female wage is
probably a less reliable statistic describing the true wage of working
individuals. The third problem is that the value of time (shadow home wage)
of non—working women is not necessarily equal to the observed wage of
rkers.Reuben Gronau has pointed out that for population subgroups inTable 2




2 Variable LIIRWGM LHRWCFACE KUSVLWKWGM LWTHYLWKY LADI constant
A. All 1hite Men (ges 22—64)
LCHR1M —.1040 .0202 .00014—.0178 892
(6.88)(.82) (.67) (4.60) (52.45)
LCHR1M .0283 .00007—0.158 —I065 9.31 88
(1.71) (.49)(5.92) (11.71) (241.6)
LC}IRIM —.0667—.007 .0004—.0222 —.0105.0103 —.0014 8.91
(2.86) (.26)(1.36) (5.45) (1.79) (2.12) (.45) (281.0)
LCHR2M .0160 —.0006—.0185 -.0796 9.19
76
(.82) (3.46)(5.83) (7.45) (203.1)
B. AllBlackMen (Ages 22—64)
LCH.1M —0643.0455.00001—.0107 8.86
(2.16)(1.71) (.031) (1.35) (255.6)
LCR1M .0480 —.00002 —.0070 —.0937 9.23 41 (2.21) (.061) (1.07) (4.50) (96.2)
LCHRIM —.0816 .0609.0000—.011 —.0043 .0011.0047 8.87 27 (2.50) (2.07) (.01)(1.1) (1.30) (.20)(1.27)(221.6)
LCHR2M .0589 -.0005 .0149 —.0701 9.12 .25
(2.11) (1.06) (1.75)(2.62) (73.89)
C. College White Men (Ages 26—64)
.0454 —.00002 —.0180 —.0872 ..21
(3..29)(.07)(2.81) (5.60) (15.8)
LCHR2M .0466 —.0001—.0161 —.0805 9.17
(3.37)(.32)(2.51) (5.16) (115.3 .46
"i. High School White Men (Ages 22—64)
LCI-1R1M .0413—.00008 —.0160 —.1092 9.31
(2.24) (.37)(4.15) (7.31 (133.8)
10
LC}IR2M .0546—.0001—.011,5 —.1032 9.26
(2.20) (.41)(2.81) (5.20) (100.1)
E. ElementarySchool White lien(Ages 19—64)
LCI1Rii .0242 .0010.0095 —.1309 9.38
(1.13)().20)(1.54)(4.78) (77i)
•1




valuesare in parenthesis beio' coefficients.
bIfth vablerme 1e redin Dr hma1csrespectively.—ii—
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"If thevarjable name is preceded by theletter L,
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fetalesrespectively.
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White Women (Ages 22—64)
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whicha large fractionare not working, the observed wage distribution
represents only one section of the total wage offer distribution.1 The
unobserved section of the wage offer distribution has been rejected by
jobseekers as unacceptable. As Gronau also demonstrates, the observed
wage may change without anyalterationsin the wages offered by firmsdue
towhat he calls a selectivity bias. For example, in time periods when
young children are present, the implicit home wage increases and many women
will leave the labor force. Indeed, it is only the women receiving the
highest wage offers in the distribution who will remain in the labor force.
Only part of the observed life cycle variation in female wages reflects
a real change in their market opportunities. In spite of these consider-
ations, the female ownwageeffect in the female equations (Table 3) is
consistent with the model. When female weekly wages are used, the coeffi-
cient is negative and significant in all but the high school sample. As
expected, a less significant and smaller negative effect is obtained with
female hourly wages. Thus, the negative sign of the ownwagecoefficient
inboth the male and female regressions support the predictions of the
model. Nevertheless, because of the biases mentioned above, a little
skepticism is in order for the female wage even though the estimated sign
is"correct".
As long as the time inputs of spouses are sufficientlystrong
substitutes,2 the sign ofthe cross substitutionwage term will be positive.
In almost every male sample, an increase in the female wage increased the
amount of male home time although this effect is not always significant.
Also, the male wage has a positive sign in the all white, high school white
and college white female home time regressions. The only troublesome
results are the negative signs of male wages in the white elementary and— 33—
especiallyblack female regressions. Some idea of the extent of substi-
tution between inputs can be obtained if we subtract the demand equations
for wives from that of husbands. If we then add the two wage coeffi-
cients, we have sx(clMx -Fx
Whenthis number is positive, market goods
areabetter substitute for male time than they are for female time. For
the total white sample, this appears to be the case. In the education
specific samples, goods are a better substitute for male home time than
for female time only in the college and high school samples. In the all
black and elementary white sample, this relation switches and goods appear
to substitute more easily against female time.
One test of consistency suggested by consumer demand theory is that
the slopes of these cross substitution terms should be equal (that is,
).However,both in elasticities and in terms of absolute
ft mt
slopes the effect of an increase in the male wage has a larger effect
female home time than an increase in the female wage has on male home
However, it is inappropriate to impose this restriction on consumer
behavior. Much of the adjustment for womentakesthe form of rather large





Table 2 also reports regressions for alternative definitions of home
time.Inaddition to working time, time spend looking for work is not
countedasavailable for home production in constructing LCHR3.Theoret-
ically, one cannot predict the effect of excluding time looking for work on
the home time wage elasticity. On one hand, this elasticity evaluated at
any wage will be greater (in absolute value) since mean home hours are
lower. But the slope component of the elasticity expression (aM/aW) should
on
time.— 34—
declineso that the net impact of excluding search time depends on
which effect is stronger.3 Although the results do not differ substan-
tially from those with the first definition of home time,34 there is a
tendency for the own wage elasticity to decline for all male groups
suggesting that the demand curve slopes have decreased sufficiently to
offset the lower mean home hours.35 The other definition of home time,
LCHR2, subtractedfromtotal yearly true annual hours spent working,
lookingfor work, and ill. The additional exclusion of ill timegenerally
hadthe effect of reducing the observed wage elasticities so that any
negative relation between wages and ill time was not strong enough to offset
the reduction in mean home hours.
The age variable gave the least satisfactory results. If a family
faced a positive interest rate, home time of both men and women was predicted
to be positively correlated with age. When home time includes all nor
working hours, the only male sample in which age has a significant positive
sign is the elementary. The age variable is positive in most of the
white female samples. The negative correlation between ageandworking
time implied by the life cycle argument could be negated in cross sections
of inter-cohort changes are important. The measured age difference is
capturing both a movementalong a life cycle hours path and across the
profiles of different cohorts. The rising levels of male and female wages
throughout the twentieth century will affect desired working time through
the familiar substitution and wealth effects. For males, the time
series evidence indicates that the income effect outweighs the substitution
effect so that the cohorteffectconflicts with thelifecycle expectation.
The substantialincreasesin recent decades in married female labor force
participation rates suggests that the secular effect should strengthen the— 35—
negativerelation of age and working time implied by the life cycle model.
Anotherfactor confounding the interpretation of age in these regressions
isthe strong positive correlation of sick time with age.37 When the
definition of home time is used which excludes time searching for work
and time ill (CHR2), the positive age effect in the elementary male and
white female samples is eliminated. In fact, a significant negative sign
appears in the all white male and black female samples.
The low values of the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that positive
serial correlation exists in these regressions. Since each observation
is a three—year moving average, errors tend to perpetuate themselves and
autocorrelated residuals were expected8 In this situation, OLS will not
generatebiased coefficients, but the calculated standard errors are too
low. In evaluating the t values, a degree of caution is in order.
The serial correlation that plagued the male regressions is present
in the female ones as well. The use of three—year moving averages is
not sufficient to explain all the autocorrelation. Female home time is
overestimated between ages22-28 and45-52 andunderestimatedin the other
age intervals. Such a long persistent pattern of positive or negative
residuals will not result from a three-year moving average, but are caused
by other factors related to the age ordering of the observations. Some
possibilities are examined in the section below on children.
Within a family unit and acrossdifferent families, thedemand for
hometime isrelated to a variety of family characteristics which could
affector strengthen the incentives provided by the market. sector.To
proxythese factors, I followed the conventional approach of economistsby
including as anindependent variable the number of children less than
S— 36—
seven(KUsv) .3 The depressing effect of young children onthemarket
participation of females has been weji. documented by others. But my work
shows that it is also a factor in white male supply functions--having
the opposite effect of increasing male working hours. One hypothesis
consistent with this evidence is that children and those comeodities comple-
mentary to children are less husband time intensive than a vector of all
other home produced goods. When young children are present, the structure
of household consumption is altered in favor of the former set of comeo-
dities enabling husbands to work additional hours. Another plausible
rationale is that units of time typically produce many household coimnodities
jointly. As the wife leaves the market to care for children, her time will
simultaneously be employed in other home activities as well thus freeing
some of her husband's time for market work.
tn every white sample, female home time increases when young children
are present. Since the abeolute size of the coefficient of I(USV is
greater for wives than husbands, both the percentage and absolute number
of female hours withdrawn from the market exceeds the percentage and
absolute increase in market hours of their husbands.Evaluated at the
mean levels, an increase in one young child less than seven would lead
to a net reduction of approximately $263 in family earnings.40 The number
of young children has no significant effect on the working time of black
wives or husbands. Indeed, this lack of response to the presence of
children is a mjor behavioral difference between the two racial groups.
A complete study of the causes of this dissimilarity should be considered
high priority research.My work does offer two explanations--the racial.
patternsof child spacing and timing and the higher rates of marital
instabilityamongblacks. According to Table 4, the fraction of the life




Fraction of Black and White Families with
Children Less Than Six Years Old
Age
19 24 29 34 39 41
28 68 76 64 37 29
68 83 74 58 39 37
Because the childbearing period is less concentrated for blacks,
there is less incentive for black women to time their market participation
at those ages when young children are not present. With a higher expected
probability of a dissolution of the marriage partnership, each black spouse
should avoid being too specialized in either the market or non-market
sectors. The costs in terms of lost job seniority and the depreciation in
market skills of leaving the market sector for even a short period decreases
with the expected durationof marriage. The labor force dimension that
producesmuch of the racial differences in the female hours behavior is
the Labor Force Participation Rates. During the childbearing period, there
is a substantial decline in the white female participation rates. Black
female participation rates are remarkably constant for most of the cycle.
Thissuggests a reluctance on the part of black women to completely leave
the market sector.
Asimple countof the numberof young children at home cannot be
expectedto measure manychangesduring the course of the life cycle in
thosecharacteristics of family structuredetermine a womana labor market
behavior.Indeed, the pattern of residuals in the white female labor supply
recressions did indicate a imisspecification in the empirical model. Female— 38—
markethours were overestimated in the age intervals twenty—eight to
forty—one and fifty—five to sixty—five while positive residuals were
present in the supply equations during the other ages. The extent of the
labor market response of married women could depend on their children's
ages and sex, and on their aspirations for educating their children
(child quality). Also the interaction of these characteristics among
siblings, including the spacing of children, might be important. To
separate some of these factors, I defined a group of variables measuring
the fraction of women at each age with children present in a set of
mutually exclusive child age categories.
In Table 5 which suimnarizes the results obtained with these variables,
it is evident that the allocation of female time varies considerably with
the ages of her children. Since young, pre—school children are notoriously
high denianders of their mother's time, it is not surprising that in almost
all samples4l an increase in the fraction of families with only pre—school
children reduces the working hours of wives. An interesting interaction
occurs when the pre—school children have siblings who are all over thirteen.
The amount of market work performed by mothers in such families either
differs little from the annual hours worked of childless wives, or as is
the case for black wives, the mothers actually work more. It appears
that the tendency to withdraw market hours when young children are present
is offset to some degree by substituting the time of older children in
some child—care activities.
But the most interesting finding is the positive effect on female
market time of children six to thirteen or children older than thirteen.
The common denominator of most economic models of fertility is that children
are assumed to be relatively wife time intensive conunodities. Yet, this— 39—
S
Table5
EFFECT OF CHILDREN'S AGE ON WORKING TIMEOFTHEIR MOTHERSa
Sample— Groups,by Age (years)
Group <6<6,<6,<6,6-13, 6-13 >136-13,
6-13 >13 >13 ——>13
Allwhites -- ? + + -
Allblacks ? ? + + ?
College whites - - ? ? + -
Highschool
whites - — — - -f
Elementary
school whites ? - ? - +
Note:
a+ indicates effect is to increase hours of work.
-indicateseffect is to decrease hours of work.
? indicates tvalueless than I.— 40—
laborsupply evidence indicates that the factor intensity of children might
well switch as a child proceeds through his aging process. Although parents
with pre—school children are consuming a relatively (wife) time intensive
commodity, these children become less time intensive as they age so that
there are stages in the life cycle when the presence of an older child
makes household consumption more goods intensive than consumption in child-
less families. Some additional evidence supports this notion of factor
reversals during the cycle. In every sample except elementary whites,
the presence of children over thirteen induces adre additional female market
time than the presence of children aix to thirteen. Some of the older
children are attending college —aquite goods intensive commodity from a
parent's point of view. Because a larger fraction of the college whites
have children attending college, It is also consistent with this hypothesis
that the additional hours wives work with children over thirteen increases
with the education level of white families.
The lesson for economists in their modelling of family behavior is
that children should not be treated as a homogenous commodity. A variety
of children's characteristics determine the relative input intensities
of home production and the ability of families to substitute market time
for household time. Many characteristics (school attendance, age) are by
their nature, intimately associated with specific stages of the cycle.
To measure the rate at which hours are withdrawn from the market due
to a "pure" income change, economists generally used an aggregate of all
current period nonearnings income. This income measure often contained
income receipts that did not correspond to the theoretical construct.
For example, the unemployment compensation, disability insurance, and
pension income is usually contingent upon the absence of market work and if
these receipts were included In the income measure, a spurious negative— 41—
correlationbetween work and income would be introduced. Because of this,
I divided all current period nonearnings income into three categories;
the first (WKY) consisted of income received because one did not work (i.e.,
unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation); the second (OADI) included
income from various private and public pension plans and was also directly
related to the amount of an individual's market work; the Unal category
was wealth income (WTHY) which included interest and dividends. It was
hoped that this last category was independent of the work-leisure choice,
and thus was the appropriate one to use when estimating an income effect.
The necessity of separating income in this manner receives empirical
backing in Tables 2 and 3. In the all white male sample, WKY has the
expected negative impact on working hours4
2Because this income is received
only when one does not work, this is at best a confirmation that it is
reasonably well reported. The second income variable, OADI, had no detectible
influence on working hours. If w'rHY is viewed as the appropriate non-labor
wealth statistic, the sign of WTHY should be positive as long as this income
had not been previously capitalized.43 But non-market time and WTHY tend
to be negatively related raising the real possibility that even these income
flows are the consequence of present and past labor supply choices of the
family. This income is largely the return on the accumulated saving of
the family unit. The magnitude of these savings is determined by current,
past, and future expected levels of market work. Individuals with large past
and current levels of market work have generated the assets that produce
this income making the positive correlation between WTHY and market time
understandable.
One advantage of placing the labor supply decision in a life cycle
context is that one can develop a unified theory of asset accumulation,— 42—
44
savings, and labor supply. Too often, individuals have attempted to
force assets and non-labor income into the confines of a single period
model, but it is only when we consider the life cycle dimension that
motivations for savings and asset accumulation become sensible. The life
cycleapproach clearly demonstrates that any observed relationbetween
assets(or non-labor income) and working hours should not be interpreted
as evidence of a causal sequence fromassetsto market work reflecting a
wealtheffect. Both are simultaneously determined by similar economic forces
and the observed relation may reflect only one's position in the life cycle.
These ideas may be illustrated by a simple example. Equations 8 -9
describe the life cycle paths of market goods consumption and hours of
market work. If an exogenous wage path is assumed, the life cycle pattern
of earnings is also given. These earnings and consumption profiles in
turn define the savings behavior of the individual at each age, and by
appropriately accumulating savings, the asset position at each point of the
life cycle is given.45 In a purely Fisherian world, the only factor deter-
mining the time path of consumption is a divergence between the interest
rate and rate of time preference.46 Consumption and earnings are equal and
age-invariant when the interest rate equals the rate of time preference.
Of course, savings and net assets are equaltozero at every point in the
life cycle. But consider another individual (diagram * 6) who does not
discount the future so severely. Consumption will rise throughout the cycle
while market earnings decline. Since earnings exceed consumption at the
early stages of the cycle, the savings generated will become positive net
assets. Net assets continue to grow until the consumption and income profiles

















dissavesandtherate of dissaving increases until net assets areonce
again zero at the endofthe cycle.
In this Fisherian world, anyempiricalassociation between assets
andlaborsupply depends on the life cyclestage.At the younger ages, one
would find a positive correlation between assets or other imcomeand
marketwork, because those with stronger future time preferences have larger
assets at every age, but work more during the younger ages. However, the
sign of this correlation reverses at the older ages. Those individuals
with greater future preferences still have greater assets but now will be
working less. Even if we confined ourselves to these periods when the
relationbetween non-earnings income and market work remains positive, the
size of an estimated income elasticity is a negative function of age. Thus,
we see that economic theory does not predict an unambiguous sign for the
relation between non—labor income and hours worked andthatthe relation
does not reflect a wealth effect.
Thesetheoretical considerations andempirical results makes one
questionthe usefulness of existing estimatesofthe income responsiveness
of working hours. The direction and magnitude of the effect on hours of
the individual income components vary greatly. Therefore, income measures
that are aggregates of these components would yield income elasticities
that differ considerably from sample to sample, because the distribution
of the components within the total depends greatly on the age, sex, and
47
education composition of the sample being investigated.— 44—
.
TheSupply Side
The supply of market hours is the mirror image of the demand for
home time. Labor economists have concentrated on the former and, for
comparative purposes, Tables 6 and 7 report results using annual market
hours as the dependent variable. As expected, the coefficients on annual
hours for males have the opposite sign and are approximately three times
larger than the coefficients on home time.48 Cross section studies have
usually found negatively sloped male supply functions. The positive slopes
I estimate are partly due to the degree of aggregation used in this study.
This presumably eliminated some of the spurious negative correlation between
hours and wage rates caused by imperfect measurement. Moreover, the purpose
of the type of aggregation employed was to attenuate the wealth effects
which produce the negative relation between hours and wages.
Three distinct male wage variables were tried——male hourly wage,
weekly wage, and earnings. Becker in his study suggested using annual earnings
to indirectly calculate a Less biased wage elasticity. He argues that earnings
have the advantage of eliminating the spurious negative correlation between
computed hourly wage and annual working hours. If b is the estimated coeffi-
cient of earnings, the implied coefficient for hourly wages is b/i—b.
However, although this transformation is algebraically correct, b will be
biased upwards since hours enter on both sides of the regression.49







Variable LHRWGM LHRWCF AGE KUSV LWKWGM CONZTANT
A.A1l White Men (A22-64)
LF{RYR:I .3217 —.058 —.0005 .0529 7.31 .75
(6.90) (.77) (.78) (4.41) (139.5)
LHRYR1 —.083 .0003 .0465 .3293 6.08 .87
(1.63) (.66) (5.66) (11.8) (51.3)
LWKSWKN —.036 .0002 .0116 .1515 3.15 .83
(1.46) (1.07) (2.89) (11.1) (54.5)
LHRS1 —.0576 —.0005 .0373 .1980 2.83 .8
(1.27) (1.38) (5.10) (7.98) (26.9)
B.AllBlackMen
LHRYRN .2305 —.1562 .0001 .0346 7.45 .20
(2.15) (1.63) (.07) (1.21) (59.7)
LHRYRN —.1654 .00001 .021 .337 6.13 .42
(2.12) (.009) (.91) (4.5) (17.8)
C.Colle geWhiteMen26-64)
LHRYRM —.1320 .OOQ1 .0548 .2583 6.45 .49
(3.27) (O.14) (2.88) (5.67) (2.7)
IlL liigSchoo1 Men (Ages 22—64)
LHiYR —.1246 —.0003 .0464 .3283 6.14 .76
(2.30) (.48) (4.10) (7.49) (30.1)
E.Elementary_School_Men (Ag 19—64)
—.0790 —.003c —.0338 .4443 5.69 .53
(1.12) (3.35). (1.67) (4.91) (14.3)
tvaiuesare in parenthesis below coetticients.
b1f thevariablename is preceded by the letter L, the variable was entered in logs.



























A. All White Women (Ages 22—64)
Logistic for partici- —.8841
pation rates yearly (4.77)

























Comparison of Direct and Indirect Estimates of Wage
Elasticities for Males
All White
Males College High Elementary Black
Direct .3217 .1217 .2581 .0204 .2035
Indirect .347 .313 .372 .395 .439
Weekly Wage .3293 .2583 .3283 .4443 .3371
As expected, the direct estimates using earnings are higher than those
obtained using hourly wage rates. The difference in the estimates are largest
for the college and elementary groups. It is in these groups with the
smallest cell size that the negative bias of hourly wages is most critical.
Male annual hours were separated into its weeks worked and weekly hours
dimensionsto determine ifthe model would work as well in explaining the
separatecomponents.5°In view of the comparable and the similarity in
signs and magnitude of the explanatory variables, it is apparently not
necessary to develop separate theories for different male supply definitions.
When one compares alternative measures of women's labor supply, a
differentconclusion emerges. Two definitions of annualmarket hours and
weeksworked were tried:(1) the average annualhoursor weeks worked of
those womenwho were labor force members;(2) the annual hours or weeks
worked of all women including the zero values for non-workers, and the
estimated coefficients differ substantially. The most striking contrast is-46--
the age variable which changes sign. Age has a positive effect when we
consider life cycle variation in the extent or intensity of market work
of labor force members. But this should not be viewed as a refutation
of the life cycle model because the rising age trend of weeks worked of
participating women is one measure of the declining turnover in the female
labor force over the cyele. among the older cohorts, there is a larger
percentage of full, time workers. Because of their stronger labor market
cosunitment, these older women in the labor force will increase the return
on their market oriented human capital by working more hours in any week.
Only when the zero values are included is it permissible to interpret age
in the manner suggested by the life cycle model -ameasure of the influ-
ence of interest rates or cohort wealth.
The decline in market hours due to the presence of young children is
much smaller when the zero values are not included. The bulk of the labor
market adjustment to the presence of children is through a total market
withdrawal (a fall in participation rates) rather than a decline in the
amount of work by those who remain in the labor force. In fact, the
addition of a young child has no effect on the number of weekly hours.
The wageelasticities arealsosmaller when the apply functions ignore
the zeros. By restricting adjustments to take place only through the
number of hours per worker, the hoursresponse to a wage change is surely
underestimated. ForSome purposes (a study of labor market turnover),
concentrating on the hours behavior of partiCipants alone may be useful.
Butthis ignores animportant avenue of labor market response -thepossi-
bilityof leaving or entering the market.Thus the more appropriate
definitions totest the life cycle model arethose that includethe zero
valuesfor non participants.Whenthezero values are included, the results-.47—
for the annual hours and weeks worked dimensions are similar and consistent
with the implications of the model.
There are theoretical and statistical distinctions that must be made
between those labor supply definitions that measure variation in hours
and weeks among labor force members and those that simply indicate whether
one is a labor force participant.5 2 Labor Force Participation Rates (LFPR)
are the most comeon example of the latter definitions •Onthe theoretical
side, we are confronting the corner solution problem. A woman' s decision
to participate in the labor force involves a comparison between her poten-
tial market wage (w) and the value placed on her leisbme (TMhome wage"l))
at the zero work position.5LFPR measure te proportion of women for
whom the market wage exceeds the home wage at zero hours of work and can
be interpretated as a point in the cumulative die tributLon function of
home wages. 54( When IZPR are used as the dependent variable ma supply —
equation,one cannot interpret the estimated wage coefficients as measure
und household production or utility functions .
Aswe know from the theory of the fkrm. supply elasticities are deter-
mined by two distinct factors: 1) The supply elastLoity fo each firm,
and 2) the distribution around any price (wage rate) of the entxy points
for firms. For LFPR the magnitude of the wage coefficients depend only
on the density of the distribution of entry points for women. The denser
the distribution the larger the estimated wage response.55 Clearly, wage
responsiveness is partly a function of the level of participation with the
largest responses expected as we move towards the mean and the smallest at
the two extremes of very low or high participation. Unfortunately, econo-
mists have tended to equate results obtained for LFPR with these for hours
and weeks worked, and also to compare groups with quite different average-48—
LFPR (men andwomenfor example)
56
The statisticti difficulties encountered result from the categorical S
natureof LFPR ifthey areusedas the dependent variable at the micro
level,the decision to participate can berepresented by a binary variable
whichreceives the valueof one ifa woman participates and zero if she
does not. When the dependent variable is binary, the use of OLBis inappro—
priate for several reasons (1) the error term is constrained to also take
two valuesso that theerrors are necessarily heteroscedastic,(2) a simple
linearregression could easily produce estimatesthatlie outside the 01
range; (3) at both extreme values the relationship is surely non linear.
Nor are these difficulties eliminated when the individual data are grouped
to form labor force rates.
To deal with these problems, several transformations have been pro-
posed to eliminate the 0-1 range of the dependent variable. The simplest
computionally is the logit Transformation which defines the dependent
variable as the natural log of the odds of working. Therefore the following
regressions were run.
PinT-p B'X1+U
Whre B' is a vector of unknown coefficients andX'is a vector of values
of the explanatoryvariables.58 Tocorrect for hateroscedastic variances,
themoment matrix was weighted by NiPi (l-P) where Njisthe number of
observationsin agiven cell.
The SEO survey allowed me to consider labor force participation var-
iables defined over both a weekly and yearly time interval. Although the
standard labor force participation rate is defined over a weekly time in-
terval, economic theory is not of much help in speca.fying th. appropriate
time interval. There may in fact be some reason to prefer the less used Syearly rate which ii pr.saiably less affected by transitory elements.
The age, children, and female wage variable give comparable results for
the two definitions, but the male wage elasticity is much lower for the
weekly rates. If changes from year to year in mA1 wagss ar. a reasonable
proxy for life cycle variation, an inter-year increas, in male wages should
reduce the fraction of woen in the labor force on a yearly basis. Its
impact if the percentage of participaAts in a particular wsekis less
clar. thU.. weekly rates measure in part th. yearly variation, they
also reflect some intra-ysar changes.The latter is a function of
within year wage variation, sasonal arc, temporary health problems,
and a n*aber of other factors not specified in thes• regressions.
Conclusion
In this paper, a model to explain intertsmpora]. time allocation of
family hers was developed and tested. For white familie;, the observec'
cross-section profiles and the regression results seem consistent with
the predictions of the model. At the present time, only the life cycle
behavior of black married woman is difficult to reconcile with the model.
The empirical, work suggested three possibl. explanations for this anomaly:
(1) the dominance of the cross-section profiles by the inter-cohort effects;
(2) the pattern of child spacing; and (3) ths uncertainty of the duration
of the family itself.f.l
Footnotes
*Iwould like to thank Professors Gary Becker, Gilbert Ghez
andH. Greqg Lewis for thecontributions they made to many sections of
thispaoer.
1Gary S. Becker, "A Theoryofthe Allocation of im," Economic
Journal,Vol. LXXV(September,1965),pp. 493-517.
2Jacob Mincer pioneered in the treatment of laborsupplyin a
family context. See his "Labor Force Participation of Married Women,'
in of Labor Economics, Universities National Bureau Conference.
Studies 14, Princeton, 1962, pp. 63-97.
3The number of such studies has expanded so rapidly that it
precludes listing them all. Some of the more important are: Bowen and
Finegan, Economics of LaborForce Particiation, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969); T. A. Finegan, "Hours of Work in the United
States: A Cross Section Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, 'lol. LXX
(October,1962); Hiam Ofek, 'The Allocation of Time in aFamily Context,'
unpublished Ph.D.dissertation, Columbia University, 1971.
4SeeGilbert Ghez, "A Theory of Life Cycle Consumption," unpublishcd
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1970; and Gary Becker, "The
Allocationof Time over Time," unpubflshedmanuscript, 1969.
5Thefollowinq model was developed in Smith (1972). It relies on
the wrk of Becker andGhez.f.2
derivationis given in R.G.D. Allen, Mathematical Analysis for
Economists (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 503—508.
7Equations(8) and (9) asse an interior solution.
8We know that + SMG+SpX —0and FF is necessarily less
than zero. Hence, (SMO +SxGp)is positive. For a proof of these
statements, see Allen, bc. sit.
9For men, this problem is not a major one. Profiles for men may
be derived by linking cross sections of different years. These are essen-
tially identical to those obtained withanycross section.
10The changes at both tails of the profile are a consequence of varia-
in both weeks worked and weekly hours. However, thedecline in annualhours
during the middle ages reflects primarily a fall in hours worked per week as
yearly weeks are somewhat stable throughout this period. This stability is
partly due to the SEO definitions of weeks worked for it includes paid vaca-
tions. The duration and frequency of vacations surely increase with age so
that a corrected weeks worked measure may also exhibit a decline.
11More precisely, the crucial factor is the difference between the
rate of interest and the rate of time preference (r —cz).
12ASS for simplicity, neutral time preference and no life cycle
variation in women' s wage rates. Using equati* 48),




will be at a minimum when mt=ar. Therefore, wages will still meW C
be risingdWt > 0)when annual working hours are at a maximum.
13Earnings (E) are the product of wage rates (w) and annual hours
worked (h); E =wh.Therefore,
dE=dw + dli.dE=0when dw =-dh
Ew h E w h
Sincehours decline first (dli< 0), wagesmuststill be rising whenthe
Ii
percentage change in earnings is zero.f.3
14Observedwages are the net earning capacity of individuals. If
humancapitaldepreciates, cbserved wages will peak after gross earning
capacity. Our model predicts that market time will peak before gross wages
and therefore. before net or observed wages.
Theaverage cell size for the college, high school and elementary
groups are 45, 90, and 34 respectively.
See Reuben Gronau, "The Effect of Childxen on Housewife's Value of
Time," and H. Gregg Lewis, "Hours of Work and Labor Force Participation
Rates," unpublished manuscripts.
17For example, let the yearly labor force participation rate be .60.
If the average work year for those women who did participate at some time
during the year is 1,000 hours, average market time for all women would be
600 hours and non-market time, 8,100.
Family size is defined as the numberofchildren living at home.
the original treatment, see Gary Becker's Human Caita1.
2Because of individually financed investments in human capital,
observed wages will be below the true oPportunity cost. of time. Since these
investments take place with greater frequency during the younger ages and
for males, the relative wages of females to males are being overestimated
at the early ages.
2.Jacob Mincer and 7rleen Leibowitz have offered an alternative hypo-
thesis to explain this phenomenon. They interpret the more rapid decline
in market work of college educated women as a differential response across
education groups to the presence of young, especially pre-school age,
children. In their hypothesis, colleQe women have a comparative advantage
in investing in the human capital of their children.f.4
22The dating of the peak in female home time also reflects the
fact that younger children are present at an older husband age, for the
more educated.
23Because of the small cell sizes, these black female profiles
contain large amounts of measurement error. With the high rates of jj
instabilityamongblacks,this is especially true at the older ages.
a4ThSmethodfollows the suggestions of Ghez in his, "A Life Cycle
Theory of Consumption."
25fhat is, individual members of a cohort are permitted to under or
over estimate their future wage levels. If the cohort's average expectation
is unbiased, the wealth effects flowing from any individual mistakes will
be eliminated in the aggregation.
26i am waiving consideration of all the familiar aggregation problems.
271f male and female wages grow at A per cent per year over time,
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28Each interviewed individual was asked the length of his latest i.llness.
The codes for this question were 0, 1—3 months, 4—6 months, 7-12 months, and
then in number of years. The month intervals were given the class midpoints.
I then calculated the average number of years that persons in any age cell
were ill. Finally, this was converted to a yearly hours equivalent.f's
29Por women who vorkd only last year, no direct information exists
on the number of hours they work in a week. Their weekly hours were
computed by assiming that their weekly hours were in the same proportion
to category (2) women as their weeks worked were to weeks worked of women
in category (2) (WKSWK4F/W1CSWK3P).
3O motivation behind such a weighting procedure ii straightforward.
To achieve the most efficient estimate, one should assign a lower weight to
those observations that are least reliable. (have the highest variance).
However, a cost is incurred with this weighting procedure. The observa-
tions that receive the smallest weight occur at the youngest and oldest
age groups. Yet, these are the observations that possess the largest
relative variation in hours and wages.
31See Reuben Gronau, The Wage Rates of Women -ASelectivity Bias,"
unpmblished manuscript.
32 sign is positive when exceeds
home time wage elasticity isI( 11
W 14
It is reasonable to assume that hours searching for work are larger at
lower wages. In the diagram below two 4eaiid curves for home time are
drawn. Demand curve BB differs from AA in that BB excludes search time.
— —f.6
At anywage,hometime islower with BB but asisalso lower. It is
as
interestingto note that the measured elasticity of the supply curve of
market hours must fall when search time is counted as part of total mar-
ket hours. Total market hours are larger, and the increase in market
hours per dollar increase in wage is smaller.
34Many recent studies have asserted that the correct labor supply
function should include searching time. None of these have confronte.d the
conceptional problems involved. For example, if unemployment ks part'y
(a seasonal phenomenen) seasonal workers would be compeniated for their
low hours by higher wages. It would be unappropriate at their ourrent wage
rates to add to thetr working time this "unemployment."
35me following table t.* theMeanValues of time spent looking for
work or ill.
Male Hours Looking for Work or Ill
All White ElementaryHighCollegeAll Black
Looking for Work32.0 70.1 30.6 12.4 49.7
Ill. Time 74.6 105.8 82.2 41.8 71.4
FemaleHoursLooking for Work or Ill
All. White ElementaryHigCollegeAll Black
Looking for Work
Ill Time
361f realwages of husbands and wives increase at Apercent over time,
the age coefficient is a(r s)+ ri(1— — S5O iiisthe income
elasticity of consumption and s the combined share of male and female timeSf.7
n(1-am)corresponds to the income effect and s5o0the substitution effect.
37For example, the siaple correlation between fraction of white males
ill, and age was .88 in the SEQ data.
38lntuitively, the OLS estimator is unbiased since overestimating the
slope is as likely as underestimating it depending on the tracking order of
the residuals •However,our uncertainty (variance) is larger. Rut standard
errors are calculated using the computed residuals. These will be too low
for the estimated regression line will fit the tracking data rather well.
390f course this approach is open to many criticisms, one of the most
important being that it ignores the endogenous character of children in an
economic model. My weak defense is that single equation estimation has a
long tradition in labor supply studies. Also, I am attempting to ke a
somewhat different criticism of the conventional approach--that there
exists a life cycle dimension to the effect family size has on the labor
market behavior of males and females.
401n the two groups in which this effect is not strong -theall
black and elementary school white suple —thecoefficient on the variable
for children less than six years old has th. expected sign, but its value
is less than unity.
41According to the first equation in Tables 2 aad 3, an increase in
one pre-schoo]. child would decreasemale home time by :0178 per cent and
increase female home time by .0359 per cent. Evaluated at the mean home
time of 6612 hours for males and 8196 for females, this implies an increase
of 107 market hours for males and a reduction of 294 for tbk.irwives. Using
the mean male and female wages of 3.44 and 2.16, this further implies an in-
crease of $371.52 in male earnings and decrease of $635 in female earnings.f.8
420nelimitationof this variablein SEO isthat itis reported for
the family unit and is not allocated among the individual members. Onedoes
not know if the uneaploznent insurance is the result of the husband or wife
not working -thevariable is more significant in the male regressions,
perhaps indicating that it is thehusband'sunemployment that produces it.
431fthe income is foreseen, the expected sign of WTHY is zero.
Because it waspreviouslycapitaitsed, it will not varywithage and
thuswould notaffect thetimtng ofmarket worker.
44The following is adopted from my unpublished paper "Assets and
LaborSupply."
45savings (S) is the 4ifference betweencurrentincome andcurrent
market goodsconsumption(Xt)
- +rAt -i.where At-are assets inthe previous
period.Assets at any agearedefined as At —A0
(1 +r)t +
46TheFisherian modelmay be isolatedby assumingthe following:
(1)Tbe wage level is constantover the cycleand the same for every
individual (that is mt 0); (2) initial assets (A )
w 0
mt
anddesired terminalassets are equal tozero. With these assumptions,








All White Elementary High College Black
WThY 271.55 92.82 189.38599.53 83.15
•44.29 79.20 42.8418.64 60.63
OAD1 121.69 74.49 133.70147.65 79.60
TOTAL437.53 246.51 365.92765.82 223.36
48Arithmetically,mt_Mtt.Mtis the ratioof sale home
NN N N at at tat






Ifearnings (y—w+h ) are used




UsingOLE as the estimator for b gives
—______
is a biased andinconsistentestimate since







+lF; (u2)—___ 1+Bf •10
2aU
Plimit as N +b=b + 1+B
Vary S
Aslong as B >1there exists a positive correlation between the
disturbance in (2) and the independent variable (E) so that b is biased
upwards. Also since B b
1—b andB>1 iapliesb<l
sothat an indirect estimate of B is also biased upwards.
500n1y the estimates for white males are reported. The conclu-
sions in the text hold for the other samples also.
may also be an underestimation because of compositional
changes in the labor force. As the female wage increases •theannual
market hours of the new entrants is likely to be below that of women
previously in the labor force.
52important contributions on this subject are Groru (








Consider two women who are alike in all respects except that woman B receives
a higher market wage than woman A. The home wage is measured by the slope
of the indifference curve. As drawn above, only woman B will work. For
Woman A, the value of a hour of leisure always exceeds the market wage.
54Following Ben Porath let f (-i)bethe density function of home
wages illustiatedbelow
If all women in this group have thesamepotential market wage, LFPR is
simply the shredded part of the distribution or LFPR —
(V(w.) — F(m) where F C ) is the cumulative distributiea
function
55Follolwing the argument of the previous footnote lZPR f Cv)
56This could explain why wage elasticities for women exceed those
of men. Also we would expect as LFPR for women have rL.en throughout the
20th century, the estimated wage elasticity would also rise.
57Fora discussion of the binarydependent variableproblem see




59Por a proof of this weighting procedure see mail pgs 632—636.
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A. Mathematical Appendix
Let family maximize lifetime utility
a-l
(1) U =( Ze dt Ol
with the production function, and time andmoneyexpenditure constraints





(3b)1Nert dt = 1NmtNmt + WftNft)e_t dt +
(4)R T JN(w +wft)e_tdt +
A0
Whenthefamily maximizes utility function (1) subject to budget con-
straint (4), the following must hold between consumption in period t andt+j:
1
—dz fz\a




Therefore consuxttion in anyperiodt+jcan beexpressed:
(r—a)i C (6)Z =Z(e — tjt
lTt+j
and since
(7) R fN tZtertdt =N—t
lrt+jzt÷jetJ)djwe may substitute (6) into equation(7)












whichis equivalent to equation (5) presented in the text.
Rarid Pare constant over the life cycle so
dzt
dir
(11) — —c—--s+aCr—a) c c
and
dir dB
(12) —= SdW +S dw—
mmtF ft Bt
The demand for male home time is
dM dZ dW d'i cIB
(l3)-—- = — (Sc÷sa)—-+Scftt
F MF X MX F MF 7ft 8t
Finally substituting equation (1.2) into (11) and(11)into (13)
givesthedemand function for hometimedescribed in the text
dW
(14) =_(sa+ SFCMF+s:a) ----
+S(c—O)
S
÷a (r—ç) +(c —1)
C CAPPENDIX B
THESURVEYOFECONOMICOPPORTUNITY
The empiricalresults presented are based on 1967 Survey of
Economic Opportunity (SEO) sample. In the spring of that year this
survey was conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Office of Economic
Opportunity to supplement information regularly collected in the Current
Population Surveys (CPS) for Februaryand Marchof each year. The survey
comprising 30,000 households (90,000 individuals) consists of twosamples:
1.Anational self—weighting sample of 18,000 households conducted
inthe same manner as the monthly CPS survey.1-"
2. In an attempt to increase the reliability of information on blacks,
a supplemental sample of 12,000 households was taken in areas with rela-
tively large concentrations of non—whites)'
Foreach family interviewed, information is provided on geographical location,
assets, liabilities, and income other than earnings. Age, sex, race, edu-
cationalattainment and family relationship data exists for every individual
1-1For a technical discussion of the sampling techniques used and the
biases that might be present in the SEO sample, see "1966 and 1967 SEO Sample
Design andWeighting," and "TheCurrent PopulationSurvey-AReportonMethod-
ology," Technical Paper No. 7, Washington, D.C., 1963.
-"Basically the methodusedwas to impose a cut-off for sample inclusion
based on the percentage of non—whites in an area. This percentage varied by
region and SMSA size. For those sampling districts above the cut-off, the
standard CPS methods were used to select households.B-2
inthe family. Finally, adult members were additionally questioned on
their work experience, earnings, last week's salary, personal health, marital
status, and women on their childbearing history.
Since the life cycle model I desired to test is set in a family
context, I created a new tape by matching individuals by their marital status.
This new tape, consisting of 17,874 families in which both spouses are
present, has on one record the asset, debt and income levels of the family
unit; personal and labor force characteristics of both the husband and
wife and some limited information on any children present. A number of
additionalrestrictions were imposed before a family was used in the final
aggregations. The final sample was limited to non-farm' Negro arid white
familieswhose husband's age was between 18and 65 inclusive,and inwhich
thehusband worked in 1966. I excluded families in which one member worked
in the survey week, but did not work at all during the previous year.-'
Finally, those families in which the husband was under 25 years old and in
the military were exc1uded." The remaining families were divided into 36
cells; two race cells (black and white) each subdivided into three education
cells (1-8, 9-12, and greater than 12 grades of husband's schooling completed)
and finally further subdivided into 6 labor force cells (one divisiondetermined
L'The farm families were eliminated bothbecauseof the difficulty of
separating their labor income fromthereturn onphysicalcapital and because
thedivision between market and home activities is not clear cut.
'There were relatively few families with this characteristic. They
were not included due to absence of yearly income data.
-'Thesemilitary families were not included because their reported wage
rates are not a reflection of their opportunity costs as a consequence of the
coercion present in the draft system.B— 3
bywhether the husband worked in the survey week andthreepossible labor
force categories for wives: no workatall, worked in previous year, and
worked in previous year and survey week). For each cell, arithmetic means
of variables were calculated by aggregating over the age of the husband.
Since the probability of being incisded in the original tape was not
identical across families, these means were constructed using the probab-
ility of sample inclusion as the weight for the family. Instead of
recording the actual number of working weeks, the SEC coded an individual
in a class interval. Since these intervals were not of equal size, it was
necessary to recode by giving an individual the midpoint of his class.
Selection of the midpoint is arbitrary but a re precise estimate would
require knowledge about the shape of the distribution in each class)' By
SEC definitions, only civilians were considered working so I assumed that
men over 25 in the armed forces worked fifty-one weeks. I have resisted
the temptation to refer to LFPWK and LFPYR as labor force participation
rates. Unlike my measure, the official definition of LFPR includes as parti-
cipants, individuals who were not gainfully employed A'TableB-i reports
the means and standard deviations for the variables used in this study.
'The intervals used were 1-13, 14—26, 27—39, 40—47, 48—49, 50—52 weeks
respectively. If, as seems plausible, the distribution of weeks in each
interval is negatively skewed, my weeks worked variable is biased downwards.
This will also introduce a spurious negative correlation between annual hours
worked and hourly wage.
official definition counts as members of the labor force those
individuals who claim to be looking for work.B-4
TableB-i
Meansa and Standard Deviations (in parenthesis) of the
Variables Used in This Study
Subsampies by Level of Educationb
All Elementary High School College All
























































































































































All Elementary HighSchool College All
Variables Whites Whites Whites Whites Blacks
LFPWK .351 .307 .366 .337 .435
(.057) (.103) (.059) (.106) (.074)
LFPYR .516 .481 .530 .493 .647




EARNM 7474.6 5372.3 7172.4 9718.3 4736.4
(1332.3) (724.09) (1127.0) (2705.3) (578.3)
WK2M 155.30 113.38 148.35 201.8 99.42
(25.66) (15.00) (21.25) (54.29) (10.15)
HRWG2M 3.82 2.91 3.59 4.98 2.67




EARN? 1304.1 1049.3 1343.3 1350.4 1296.6
(208.97) (335.5) (231.1) (337.3) (379.5)
WK2F 68.05 57.01 66.94 77.69 54.30
(5.04) (10.02) (6.36) (12.19) (11.23)
HR2F 2.16 1.77 2.10 2.53 1.68
(.146) (.208) (.122) (.331) (.262)
NonLabor Income
WKY 44.29 79.20 42.84 18.64 60.63
(9.24) (30.39) (15.61) (12.63) (26.63)
OAD1 121.69 74.49 133.7 147.65 79.65
(80.64) (63.25) (97.35) (136.9) (73.43)
WTHY 271.55 92.82 189.38 600.3 83.13
(160.03) (79.54) (119.97) (401.1) (63.06)
Health
HLTWJI4 .0577 .0767 .0614 .0286 .057
(.041) (.059) (.043) (.020) (.045)
HLTWKF .093 .131 .098 .054 .135

























































the three year moving averages
for ages 19—64 inclusive and are the averages over
bThe classification of the subsaniples is according
the husband.
CMeans are for female maritet participantsonly.
Source: The 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity




For this study, the final sample was limited to households in
which the husbands performed some market work in 1966. For a numberof
reasons, this restriction was--not expected to seriously impair the relia—
bility of the results presented. First, the overwhelming majority of
married males were in the sample since only a relatively minor fraction
of husbands are not members of the labor force. Moreover, if non—workers
were included, one would again encountertheproblem (as we did for females)
of the absence for these observations of the necessary wage data. A
second consideration is the hypothesis that complete male home specialization
is due primarily to factors such as ill health and participation in schooling
and military activities. In particular, it is not generally the consequence
of the family relative wage structure. Hence, eliminating the nonparti—
cipants allows one to concentrate on those families where the "economic"
model is more applicable. To check these suppositions a pass was made
throughthe SEOtape not only to count the number of non-working marriód males
in 1966 but also to find the reason given by them for their non-participation.
Tables B-2 and B-3 summarize the results of that run for white and black
males respectively. If we included these men, oursamplesize of approx-
imately 18,000 would increase only by around600observations. More
importantly, only 18 white and 13 black males were not working because of an
inability to find work. For both races approximately ninety per cent of the
male workers gave retirement or poor health as the reason they did not work.
It seems clear then that very little was lost because of the decisions to
exclude these families from this study.Table 8-2
REASON NOT WORKING IN 1966 (W}IITE MARRIED MALES, AGES 18_70)a
Caring for Total # of
Age Reason Given: Could NotIll orHocofGoing to In 0bservaions
Group Find Work DisabledFamilySchool Military Retired Other fly Row
18—20 0 0 0 1.0 0 0 0 1
20—24 .053 0 0 .421 .368 .158 0 19
25—29 .167 .167 0 .167 .250 0 .25. 12
30—34 .059 .471 0 .118 .177 .177 0 17
35—39 0 .50 0 0 0 .350 0 20
40—44 .038 .615 0 .0309 .155 .077 .077 26
45—49 .033 .700 0 .0&7-.033 .100 .067 30
50—54 .039 .706 0 0 0 .236 .020 51
55—59 .0140 .622 0 0 0 .324 .041 74
60—64 .028 .563 0 0 0 .394 .014 142
65—70 .017 .220 .004 0 0 .753 .007 287
Totaillof
Observations
by column 18 282 1 18 18 326 18 679





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A single cross—section provides an inadequate representation of
life cycle behavior. Hopefully, longitudinal data will soon render the
use of cross-sections for this purpose unnecessary. To some degree, one
can disentangle the cohort and life cycle influences by pooling a series
of cross-sectional samples of different calender years)1 Depending on
the number of such samples available, we can identify individuals of the
same age who are members of different cohorts.a" Profiles similar to
those obtained from the 1967 SEO were derived from the 1960 U.S. Census,
and in this appendix the two sets of profiles are compared to determine the
extent of the bias present due to the use of a simple cross-section.
Male Profiles
Figures Cl and C2 compare the 1960 and 1967 annual hours profiles for
males. For both years these profiles have a similar inverted U shape.
Apparently, this profile has shifted upward between these years except at
1/—Welchused this technique to study the returns to schooling. See
his "Black—White Differences in the Return to Schooling," Unpublished, Jan. 1972.
'For example, if a 1960 cross—sectional sample is used, the individuals
who are forty- years old, are members of he 1920 cohort. Each age will cor-
respond to a distinct cohort, and there wouldbeno way of separating the cohort
and age effects. If we used a 1970 survey in addition to the 1960 one, people
aged forty would be members of the 1920 and 1930 cohorts and a separate esti-
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Mean Lifetime Market Participation of Married Men and Women, Ages 19-64
By Race and Education


































































































































19602133.7 43.74 48.55 NAC NA 2133.7 2.74
White Males
High School 1967 2171.6 44.15 49.06 NA NA 2171.6 3.59
1960 1535.2 36.2 35.62 .43 .29 512.4 2.10
White Females
High School 1967 1496.2 34.62 37.14 .53 .37 594.0
1960 2130.9 43.63 48.42 NA NA 2130.9 3.67
White Males
College 1967 2189.2 44.26 49.33 NA NA 2189.2 4.98
1960 1436.3 34.37 34.92 .42 .28 467.0 2.53
White Females
College 19671434.5 33.71 35.82 .49 .33 505.6
Notes:a. Averaged over labor market members only.
b.LFPR labor force participation rate.
c. NA =Notavailable.
Source: 1960 Census and1967 S.C -2
the youngest ages. With only two calender years represented, it is
impossible to determine whether this upward shift represents a secular
trend or is produced by cyclical factors.Compared to 1960, 1959 was a
year of relatively high unemployment and the procyclical behavior of
hours worked could conceivably account for the different levels. Since
low skilled workers are more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations, this may
also explain the larger upward shift for blacks)1 The absence of an
increase in the levels at the youngest ages partly reflects the secular
increases in education level. The main conclusion from this comparison is
that for males at least the use of cross—sectional data does not give that
misleading a picture of their true life cycle profiles.
Female Profiles
The stability of the cross-sectional profiles between calender years
that characterized the male profiles does not hold for the female profiles.
Thesubstantial, secular increases in market participation of married females
isof course well known. Interms of the most comprehensive definition of
hometime, for both black and white married females the profile shape remains
'The education specific profiles for white males in 1960 are not given
toconserve space. These 1960 profiles are again quite similar to those in
1967 with the 1967 profiles lying above the 1960 ones for each education class.
terms of weeks worked and hours perweek,for whites there exists
verylittle difference in the two samplesexcept for the somawhat higher
levelsin 1967. For blacks, almost all the increase between these years appears
in the weeks worked dimension which generally lies 3-4 weeks below the 1967
profiles. For weekly hours in 1960, there exists little between age dispersion
for blacks with most ages reporting slightly more than 40 hours.
.C- 3
quite similar with an increase in average market work at all ages. The
striking racial difference in the life cycle profiles that was observed in
1967 also appears in 1960. For the education specific profiles for white
married women, the general shapes are preserved, but there apparently has
been little shift in the college profiles. The most striking comparison
between the two years takes place for the various supply dimensions for
women. It is well established and gives support to the rapid secular increases
in the fraction of women who participate in the labor force. This increase
in participation rates for whites is especially pronounced at the younger
ages. But this rapid increase in market participation among married females
does not appear in the other labor supply dimensions--annual or weekly hours.
Indeed, weekly hours for white females was generally higher in 1960 than
in 1967. Also we see from Table C-i that the annual hours worked for women
who did participate was 25 hours higher in 1960 than in 1967. Thus, concexi-
trating on the LFPR dimension of labor supply exaggerates the secular
increase in female market participation. On average, all married women in
1967 worked 85 hours more in 1967 than in 1960. This is a smaller average
increase than occurred for black males between those two years (104 hours).
For black married women there has been a tendency for the market work of
participants to rise between 60 and 67. There is also a larger increase in
average market work for black women than for white women. Thus, for women
the potential advantages of longitudinal data over a simple cross—section
seems more clear cut.
A Comparison With Becker's 1960 Census Study
Gary Becker, in his empirical work with the 1960 U.S. Census, produced
regressions quite similar to those suarized in this chapter. The consis—Table C—2
ComparisOn ofRegressions With Becker,sa For Malesb .



















































variable is other familyincome.
variableis family size, while mine is number of children less
Wages


















































variable: other non-labor income.C -4
tencybetween his work and mine provides a strong check onthepower of
thelife cycle model. Not only does nis data pertain to a different
calender year, but the sampling design of the Census is quite distinct from
that of the SEO survey.Table C-2 compares the twostudies. The two
studies. gave remarkably similar estimates for the male wage variable in
the all white, high school, and elementary group. In my work, the estimated
coefficient on male hourly wages is better (more negative and significant)
than Becker's in the college and all Black runs. Since I had a more appro-
priately defined wage variable for wives, the increase in the size of the
cross wage elasticity is encouraging)-' The sign of the age variable appears
to be as inconsistent across the studies as it is among the groups in either
study. The numberof children under seven seems a better variable than
simplyfamily size. On the whole the similarity in the results of these two
separate works is a rather rare affirmative test of a theory.
Becker's variable was deficient for threereasons: (1) it includes
income other than earnings; (2) it is reported income for all other family
members not simply the wife; and (3)itis a yearly and not hourly (price of
time) concept.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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